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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Pretend play

worlds and

seem

is

the ability to escape the constraints of reality and

may seem distant

possibilities that

to accept the terms

pretend play

is

of this situation with

is

little

question.

something

is

else, e.g.,

development of pretend play

a spoon to feed him or herself or a

is

an interesting issue

been hypothesized to be an important element

and cognitive

reseai'chers.

abilities

in itself;

years.

ability

1993)

The

however, pretend play has

in children's

development of

activities

by the

child,

and

less

is

on

his or her

interest to

comprehension or

changing, however, as researchers have

discovered that through production of pretend play, comprehension

window

This

& Kavanaugh

and has therefore become of additional

understanding of these actions. This emphasis

assessed.

doll.

The majority of research on pretense has focused on the production or

of these

imitation

in

able to use an object, for example a popsicle stick, and

and becomes more complex and integrated over the next several

creativity

children

One of the key elements

has been demonstrated as early as eighteen months of age (Harris

also

young

the capacity to use substitution in pretend scenarios. Substitution refers to

an action where the pretender
act as if it

to adults. Remarkably,

visit different

Thus research on

children's comprehension

into the thinking processes displayed

may

also be

of pretense has provided another

by young children as well as into

their

understanding of real and imaginary events and the mental structures required to make
the distinction. Although research has begun in this area, there are

to be answered.

1

still

many

questions

A. The Development of Pretend Play

Many

developmental changes are associated with pretend play. The different

stages associated with the changing structure of pretend play and the eventual ability
to

engage

in object substitution are

summarized

in this section,

based mainly on work done

by McCune-Nicolich and Fenson (1984). In general though, the beginnings of symbolic
play can be observed during Piaget's sensorimotor period.

By

about 13 months of age,

children can substitute objects in pretense play highly similar to the referent that the child

is

pretending

to be. For example, an

it

These actions are based on the

child's

empty cup may be used as a cup with

own daily

activities

tea in

it.

and comprise single actions

involving only the child. Eventually, between 12-18 months of age, the child's activities

become

less

stage into

centered on the

two components;

self.

the

McCune-Nicolich and Fenson (1984) separate

first

consists

second other-directed active play, that

is,

this

of object- and other-directed acts and the

play involving other characters as active

agents. Other-directed acts (e.g., pretending to brush a doll or a mother's hair) can be

observed before object-directed acts

(e.g., stirring

a spoon in a cup). However, by 19-

24 months of age these two kinds of actions are reported to occur equally often
pretend play (Fenson

& Ramsay

1980).

As

in

the child approaches 24-30 months of age,

other-directed active play emerges. For example, the child will place a hairbrush in a

doll's

hand

in

order for the doll to use

it

(Corrigan 1982). In addition to the actions

associated with the characters, at times emotions will sometimes be applied to these

and
"playmates," providing evidence for the child's understanding of the perceptions

roles

of others

in the

pretend episodes.

2

Parallel to these stages

is

the development of integrated pretend play, in which a

solitary act (e.g., brushing the doll's hair)

larger context (e.g., the doll

wash her

is

becomes

part

of a

storyline

employed within a

getting ready to go to school, so she has to brush her hair,

face etc.). Although children at 19 months of age display "single scheme"

actions during their play (e.g., the same action used on two different characters) and

decontexualization

appears,

it

is

(e.g.,

a greater

use a wider range of substitute objects)

ability to

not until 24 months of age that the child produces multischeme actions

(McCune-Nicolich

& Fenson

1

984) and therefore integrated pretend

actions include successive actions (e.g., putting a doll

blanket),

on a pillow and covering

already noted, the child's

first

For example, a child
teacup (Jackowitz

first

will initially use

& Watson

1

in

with a

both form and function.

an empty container, but not a piece of paper as a

980, Fenson

glance seems to contradict this

& Ramsay

initial

1980).

limitation

One

set

of observations

comes Irom an experiment

done by Mandler and McDonough with 14-month-olds (Mandler 2000).

doll,

it

demonstration of object substitution consists of

using objects that have a general similarity to their referents

infants

Multischeme

and eventually planning of pretend episodes.

As

that at

play.

were shown a

doll drinking out

along with the choice of a coffee

the fiying pan as the coffee

interpreted by

mug to

of a teacup.

mug or a

When these

fiying pan, they

infants

In this study

were given the

were just as

likely to

use

give the doll a drink. However, these results were

Mandler (2000) as an overgeneralization of the "container properties" of

up to 20 months of age disphy
the fiying pan, rather than as a symbolic event. Children
overgeneralization of properties of objects.

errors to be

domain

restricted.

However, Mandler (2000) found these

In other words, the child

3

was

able to incorporate certain

properties of the fiying pan in their play behavior, such as

allowed

ways

to be used in

it

that

fit

into the "container"

can hold

it

domain but not

For example, the child did not use a fiying pan to brush a

doll's hair.

demonstrate that children can use substitute objects with an atypical

activity.

Moreover, Mandler (2000) theorizes the

child

is

which

liquid,

in

other ways.

These

results

fianction in their play

not substituting the frying pan

for a cup; instead he or she actually thinks the pan, because

it

holds liquid,

is

acceptable

for giving a drink to the doll. In other words, the representational abilities involved in

object substitution later in development

child's choice could

may not have been required

here; instead the

have derived from his or her knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of

objects and their acceptable uses.

By

19 months, as they gain more experience with a particular object's

children are less likely to use the object as a substitute object

from the intended play
identities.

multiple

have a

fiinction.

However, they do begin

For example, they can pretend

ways during a

it's

has a different ftinction

which often

order to pretend

it

is

something

else.

fiinction to the object for

very similar

in

ftinctions in

pretended

identity.

In other words,

the object in

Nevertheless, these objects usuaUy have a similar

which they are

substituting (e.g., the square block

shape to a bar of soap) (Jackowitz

years of age children are able to engage

fiinction

ambiguous

a bar of soap because the block does not

do not need to ignore or modify information they have regarding

children

form or

with

is

it

to use items with

that a square block,

child's play activities,

salient identity that interferes

if

fiinction,

& Watson

1

980). After about three

in substitution involving

and do not necessarily share the form or

fiinction

of the

items that have a salient

identity they are being

a "telephone") (Musatti
substituted for (ex. they can use a shoe as

4

is

& Mayer

1987).

B. Cognitive Significance

Pretend play

is

both interesting and entertaining, but does

it

serve other functions

for children? Children fi-eely engage in play activities throughout their development, an

activity that

more

can provide a window

into their thinking

and understanding. Pretend play,

provides an opportunity for researchers to investigate the early

specifically,

emergence of certain cognitive

abilities.

There

pretend play represents children's cognitive

is

some question

capabilities.

as to

what extent

Vygotsky (1978) commented

that children could display certain cognitive behaviors earlier in their development with

the aid of a

more

cognitively advanced play partner as seen in pretend play.

On the

hand, Lillard (1993a) offers an opposing viewpoint, that although these children

performing

activity,

at greater cognitive levels

than

is

seen

may be

they are outside of the pretense

they do not truly understand the representations or mental states necessary for

the task. Therefore, this level of pretend play

abilities

when

other

on understanding cognitive

specific task they

would not demonstrate

children's early

representations, but rather their understanding

on the

were given.

In an effort to address this concern,

Golomb and

Cornelius (1977) took four-

in pretend play after
year-old non-conservers and trained them with substitution tasks

conservation task. This training
they had been tested on both a liquid and a solid

included acting

on a

substitute object (e.g., clay) in a

way

that conflicted with

actions as if suggesting
properties. For example, the experimenter initiated

it

its

real

was a

actions, an indication that the
"sausage." The children strongly objected to these

children

were not completely separating pretend

prompted the children

fi-om reality.

The experimenter

generaUy remarked that the
to explain their objections. Children

5

experimenter could not eat the "sausage" because "although they were pretending
food,

it

was

and

liquid

The next day the non-conserving

really clay."

children

it

was

were again given

solid conservation tasks. This time they did significantly better

on

the

conservation task and better than a control group that did not receive the pretend
training.

Golomb and

Cornelius (1977) hypothesize that making the children describe

the transformations and explaining that the experimenter

when

in reality

it is still

clay,

is

pretending the clay

is

sausage

enabled them to extrapolate similar knowledge to the

conservation task. Pretend play

may

enable the child to acknowledge the reversibility of

objects in different settings. Although the child and experimenter could pretend the clay

was a "sausage" they could recognize
They could go back and

forth

the duality of the object; reality and

between these

though water

is

do not change. By extension

The question

in the

case of the

to the conservation task, even

placed in a different container and "altered"

amount of water has not changed.

believe.

identities to suit their play behaviors. In

other words, even though items can be transformed (by using pretense

clay), realistically they

make

still

in

appearance, the actual

remains though, as to what

this

task actually demonstrates. If indeed children were capable of conserving earlier than

is

reported in previous research, pretend transformations seemed to allow the child to

understand the task

usuaUy

inhibit

them

in their

own terms,

perhaps eliminating the constraints of reality that

that
fi-om answering correctly. For example, in reality they assume

the bigger something appears, the bigger

and

this rule is

it is.

allowed to be broken. Once

Yet, during pretense anything

this

is

has occurred they are open to

possible

it

conservation task. Again,
occurring in reality and therefore perform better on the

hard to distinguish

if children

it

is

information fi-om the
are truly learning and transforming

6

pretense activity to the conservation task, or
enabling

them

if

some other mechanism

is at

work

here,

to succeed at this task.

Perhaps an even more important role for pretense behavior

development can be found

in the

in cognitive

development of theory of mind. Theory of mind

refers

to an individual's ability to understand another person's point of view. In children this

ability

does not seem to be established

until

about four years of age (Flavell

& Miller

1998). According to Leslie (1987), pretend play provides a starting point for this

Around 24 months of age,

ability.

other-directed active play, which includes the ability of a child

to recognize emotional attributes

of pretend play partners from

his or her

view, begins to appear. Leslie (1987) believes this form of pretense

own

may be

point of

a precursor

to understanding the mental state of others. Pretend play allows the child to think about

how

imaginary events

may

affect others (e.g., that if the child

took away a toy from

or her doll "playmate," the doll would be sad). The child could resort to and extend

understanding to processing real events and eventually separate

his or her

own

his

this

feelings

and emotions from those of others.

C. Theories of Object Substitution During Pretend Play

A role for pretend play in cognitive development seems quite counterintuitive.
The

child

is

assumed

to acquire an understanding

of how the world operates from

belong to
experiencing the environment. The child must learn what categories objects

(e.g.,

a dog

is

an animal) and what characteristics objects possess

(e.g.,

a dog has a

tail).

How then does the child abandon the restrictions on objects established by this
understanding

in

order to use them as substitutes

7

in

pretense? Leslie (1987) proposed a

decoupling model to describe the mental processing the child engages
to explain his or her ability to engage in object substitution. Leslie

children take their primary representation of an object (e.g., this

make a copy of it
this

for use in the pretend setting. This copy,

empty cup has tea

in

it)

can be tagged, so

representation. Leslie (1987) claims that

known

if

it

now

during pretense

987) suggests that

an empty cup) and

involving pretense (e.g.,

will not interfere

with the primary

children simply believed an object with a

identity could easily take another identity, "representational abuse"

Representational abuse refers to overextension of the

life

is

1

(

in

new

would occur.

identity into the child's real

environment.
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) note several limitations to Leslie's (1987)

decoupling model. Specifically, they point out the need for a deletion process associated
with substitute objects during pretense. If a child pretends a banana

example, he or she must not only make a copy of the banana to use

situation, but also

the

new

must disregard

identity assigned to

it

characteristics

(e.g.,

of the banana

is

a phone for

in the

pretend

that could interfere with

the yellow color of a banana since a phone

is

usually

not yellow). Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) also point out that Leslie's (1987) theory
centered on the object used
contrast, Harris and

mechanism

in

pretend play instead of the pretend episode

Kavanaugh (1993) emphasize

itself

is

In

the pretend episode, and a flagging

to differentiate the episode from reality. Harris and

speculate that the pretend episode prescribes a directionality

in

Kavanaugh (1993)
terms of how a child uses

pretend episodes encourage
substitute objects in their pretend play. In other words, the

the child to use

some

child to realize the

objects, rather than others as substitutes.

It

may be

need for a certain object during a pretend episode

8

easier for a

(e.g., the

need for a

cup

if they

(e.g.,

are pretending to have a tea party) and to look for an object
that

a seashell), rather than choosing the object and placing an identity upon

shell in fi-ont

of him or her would help the child using

Lillard (1993a) addresses

substitution.

in

therefore, there

is

Lillard

and the

no need

link

between the

for a deletion process.

her theory on object

real identity

'is

a comb'.") and

identities they apply to the objects they use during this play activity.

of an object

both the

real

a square block)

(e.g.,

and pretend

(Amsel, Bobadilla, Coch

may be

identities;

& Remy

1

an individual to be cognitively

is

at

some

In other words, the real identity

make

The

child

is

aware of

they are, however, on different cognitive levels

996). Lillard

free to carry

level in the mind.

(

1

993a) compares

like driving a car after

this to driving while

many

on a conversation though

years, permits

the fact of driving

In other words, a child could pretend that a

a cookie yet maintain the knowledge that

and, therefore, not

real

"cognitively backgrounded" in

identity (e.g., a sandwich).

having a conversation. Implicit knowledge,

always present

its

Instead the identities are maintained at

influence or interfere with actions during object substitution.

block

of an object with

Reality lays the foundation for the children's pretense

comparison to the pretend

is

(e.g., if a

it

(1993a) argues that either through action or mental representations, the

identity

need

as a cup).

a single representation (e.g., "1 pretend the banana

different cognitive levels.

activities

this

(1993a) theorizes that object substitution, unlike Leslie's (1987)

Lillard

pretend identity

it

some of these concerns with

decoupled model, does not involve a

may

fills

it

the mistake of trying to eat

provides a clear division of real versus pretend

is

truly a block in the

it.

Lillard's

identities,

(1993a) theory

and explains why children are

different contexts.
unlikely to conftise the functions of the object in these

9

background,

Pemer (1991) has

offered

still

another alternative theory of pretend play. His

theory outlines an even greater distinction between

Pemer (1991) proposes

(1993a).

pretense and

the

reality.

moment and

reality

and pretense then

that children understand the difference

They knowingly control which mental

between

state they are

they also can switch back and forth between the mental

Lillard's

engaged

in at

Pemer'

states.

theory differs from other theories, particularly with respect to his views on symbolism
pretense.

Pemer (1991)

believes that while the child

new

treats the substituted object with a

is

identity, not as

example, a child using a popsicle as a toothbmsh

is

engaged

in pretense,

a symbol for

its

he or she

For

referent.

treating the popsicle "as

in

if

it

were a

toothbmsh, not as a symbol for a toothbmsh. He argues that a tme understanding of
symbolization means that the substitute object would have certain characteristics of the

referent (e.g., bristles

characteristics in

of a toothbmsh) and would be used by the

mind even though not

believes children at a

actually present

young age do not demonstrate

Kavanaugh (1993) argue

on the

object.

this ability.

against this interpretation based

child with these

However, Harris and

on their work done with two-

year-olds. AJready at this age, for example, children react to a pretend

surface

when

would now be wet. They

spilled

characteristics

of the

spill

as

if the

act as if the pretend "container" had liquid in

would therefore have

object substitution, a child, with

Pemer (1991)

it

and

appropriate, specific consequences. Thus, during

little

hesitation,

seems willing to attach the

real reference to the substitute

and

appropriate action such as pretending to wipe up the
(1993), these actions are evidence of symbolic

10

will

spill.

abilities in

even engage

in

an

For Harris and Kavanaugh

young

children.

Another criticism of Pemer's position offered by Harris and Kavanaugh
(1993)
that at any

moment

in

a pretend scenario children are aware of the

realistic constraints

the objects they are using, a conclusion also reached by Lillard (1993a).

Golomb and

(1993a) nor Leslie (1987) discuss

How do

object substitution.

later

To

or

is

the

in

any real

detail a

The work of

Pemer (1991),

memory component

children store this pretend episode in

memory

lost

once a pretend scenario

is

a popsicle stick) to 2 and 2.5-year-olds

in

two

Lillard

to the act

memory? Can

states,

by the experimenter

would hand
does with

in

and

in the

different scenarios (e.g., a dinner or

first

scenario and say;

identity

second scenario "Show

"Show me what Teddy

me what Teddy

does with

brush." Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) purposely did not use action words

when requesting

and

each of the scenarios. For example, the experimenter

the child a popsicle stick in the

his spoon,"

be

objects with ambiguous identities (e.g.,

bedtime scenario). They asked the children to use the object according to an

it

it

of

over?

address some of these issues concerning symbolism, mental

memory, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) presented

given to

on

Cornelius (1977) showing children did not allow the experimenter to eat the

clay sausage supports such a position. Furthermore, neither

accessed

is

the action from the child. This

was

like

to ensure that the child

his

"feed"

was not

using verbal cues as the basis for acting out his or her understanding of what was being

asked.

They found

that 2.5-year-olds

substitute object in the

two

were able to use

different identities for the

different scenarios. Children this age did not overextend the

identity given to the popsicle in the

first

scenario to that popsicle in the second scenario.

actions than the 2.5In contrast, two-year-olds produced substantially fewer pretend

year-olds. Moreover,

when

substituted
they did not receive credit for successful use of a

11

object, they either failed to act out the identity with the substitute
object or used
literal

fashion unrelated to the experimenter's request

(e.g., the child

it

in

a

placed the teddy on

the block instead of "feeding teddy" the block).

Harris and

in

Kavanaugh (1993)

attribute the ability

of the 2.5-year-olds to engage

these different object substitutions in the two scenarios to the acquisition of a

"flagging mechanism."

The

child identifies the scenario as pretend,

and attaches a

flag to

the substitute object with certain stipulations during a given scenario. For example, a
child

may have

generated a flag indicating

that,

"During

this scenario, this

pretend tea." This flagging process allows the child to incorporate
into a play episode.

The

scenarios, allowing

him or her

specific

is

and pretense

child uses separate flags for an object in each of the different

to

keep track of each

episodes. According to Harris and

mechanism

reality

cup contains

Kavanaugh

identity in the various pretend

(p. 63,

1993),

when

the flagging

applied; "... children attach a flag neither to a mental representation of a

prop nor to the mental representation of a prop's category but simply

to a mental

representation of the current pretend episode."

These
in

it is

flags

may be

edited during an episode as well. If a cup with "pretend" tea

spilled, the original representation will

now represent

be altered to

reflect this

change and

a "pretend" empty cup. This editing allows for changes

setting without causing confiision for the child in

how

in the

will

pretend

he or she represents each object

in

scenario
other contexts. These flags are stored in the child's representation of a specific

and prevent the chUd fi-om engaging

in,

what Leslie (1987)

abuse." Overextension of the pretend substitutions

and the objects associated with them

in

is

called "representational

avoided because flagged

identities

each scenario are put aside and no longer read

12

after the

completion of a pretend scenario. The flags are not deleted from memory,
but

are simply placed in long-term storage for access

(1993) believe

if the child is

later.

Thus, Harris and Kavanaugh

reintroduced to the same pretend scenario, the flags will be

reinstated for use once again, a prediction they never tested.

their

work

is

the

first

They

also conclude that

of its kind to demonstrate children keeping track of multiple

substitutions.
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CHAPTER 2

STUDY DESIGN
Harris and

represent

two

Kavanaugh (1993) found

identities for the

Through

"flagging."

same

this flagging

that children at 2.5 years

between scenarios, on the basis of

object,

mechanism the

applied to the substitute object, establish a

of age could

new

child could ignore the previous identity

identity for

it,

and use

it

in the

second

scenario without contusion. Yet, one anecdotal observation has offered limited support
to the

view

that children can pretend that a substitute object can have

within the same scenario.

Dunn and Dale (1984)

two

described a dialogue between a two-

year-old and his older sibling. During a pretend episode the older child

year-old that a cushion

willing to attribute

one

is at first

it

is

particular object (the cushion) with

important to note that

in this particular

out the instructions from his older sibling with

substitution.

That

is,

the

two

tells

the two-

a gate and later a tunnel. The younger child seemed

two

as a tunnel), but within the given scenario, not just between

However,

identities

little

identities (as

two pretend

scenarios.

play episode the child could act

demand

for

comprehension of object

identities attributed to the cushion, a tunnel

share similar acts involving locomotion; both are used to

move

and a gate,

through. In other words,

the child did not necessarily have to understand multiple object substitutions

engage

in the activity.

These

and Kavanaugh's (1993)

findings,

a gate, then

in

order to

however, highlight the need to follow up Harris

original research

and investigate the role

that flagging different

scenarios plays in permitting object substitution.

In this experiment, in

engage

one condition 2.5 and 3 -year-old children were asked

in object substitution involving

two

different scenarios using the

14

same

to

objects, a

condition designed to replicate Harris and Kavanaugh
(1993). In addition, a condition

was included
pretend play

this

to determine whether children these ages could
use substitute objects in

when the

objects had

two

identities within the scenario.

Would

children of

age be capable of keeping track of substitute objects when they are unable
to "flag"

the given identities by separate scenarios?

In their original

work

Harris and

Kavanaugh (1993) included a very wide range

of age groups. For example, younger two-year-olds were between 24-31 months of age.
In the present study the age range for our younger children

was narrowed between 29-3

months of age. Children

both Between-Scenario and

in this

age group were included

in

Within-Scenario conditions. Because 2.5-year-olds are assumed by Harris and

Kavanaugh (1993)

to be restricted

were not expected

to be successful in the Within-Scenario condition. Thus, 3-year-olds

were

by the "flagging mechanism" during pretense, they

At

also included in the present experiment.

age children begin to engage

this

in

object substitution spontaneously and are no longer limited by actual identities of objects;

for example, they can pretend a shoe

is

a car (Musatti

& Mayer

1987). Given their

increased flexibility in engaging in object substitution, children three years of age should

be able to keep track of an object given multiple
their behavior

would suggest an advance

in the

identities

even within a scenario.

If so,

understanding of object substitution

relative to the 2.5-year-olds.

Harris and

Kavanaugh (1993)

establish a pretense situation, children

also suggested that if given the opportunity to re-

would be able

act accordingly with the substituted objects.

order to shed

light

on

to retrieve the flagged

However, they never tested

this possibility the current study includes a

15

memory

memory and

this claim.

phase.

In

Gopnik

and Slaughter (1991) touched upon the

issue

of memory

in

some research involving

theory of mind that included a pretend task. Gopnik and
Slaughter (1991) gave children
a stick and told them to use

it

as a

spoon when the children were asked

to pretend with a

bowl. They then changed the context of the play scenario by
bringing the children to a

where a magician's hat

different table

now

When questioned

a magic wand.

remembering

either the first or

demonstrated an

ability to

lay

and where the children were told the

later,

stick

was

neither 3- nor 4-year-olds had difficulty in

second identity assigned to the

The

stick.

keep track of and remember multiple

3 -year-olds

identities for a single

object used during object substitution in a Between- Scenario condition.

Since 3-year-olds, according to Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) display an

remember
to

the

two

compare the

memory
study's

object substitutions, they serve as an important control against which

2. 5 -year-olds

abilities in

memory

performances

in the present study.

No

studies addressing

pretense have been done with this younger age group. The present

trials differed fi-om

that the participants

rather,

ability to

those carried out by Gopnik and Slaughter (1991) in

were not required to verbally

had to choose among various objects as

to

recall the identities

how they were

of the

used

objects, but

in the initial

pretense activity. For example, in Gopnik and Slaughter's (1991) study children's

memory was

we moved

assessed by their response to the question;

over here, what did you pretend the

stick

"When I

first

was then? Did you pretend

spoon or as a wand?" In the present study we assessed memory by
the child to select the object, which had been used in a specific

scenario.
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asked you, before

it

was a

verbally instructing

way

in

a previous

Each

memory

child

was asked

to

choose among the substitute objects on the basis of their

for the identities assigned to each object. Evidence of memory,
especially in the

Between-Scenario condition compared to the WitWn-Scenario condition, would provide
further support for the importance of a flagging

activity.

that their

and

is

mechanism

in children's

If children perform better in the Between-Scenario condition

memory

for an object's use depends

on

not linked directly to the object.

17

it

pretense

would suggest

the flagging associated with scenarios

CHAPTER 3

METHODS
A. Participants

Participants

of Massachusetts

were

at

5

1

children

from the community surrounding the University

Amherst. Three children were excluded from the analyses for

failing to

complete the experiment, when they refused to participate

activity.

The remaining

males, age range

in the

pretend

children included twenty-four 2.5-year-olds (12 females, 12

= 29-31 months) and twenty-four

3 -year-olds (14 females, 10 males,

age range = 35-38 months). The children's names were obtained from

birth records

provided by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The parents were contacted

by

letter;

a phone

call

initially

then followed to recruit participants.

B. Materials
Testing took place in a research suite on the campus of the University of

Massachusetts.

Two

different

window

scenes served as backdrops for the two scenarios,

one suggesting daytime, the other nighttime. The scenes were displayed on two
adjacent walls

front

different

ofa4.8mx4mx2.5m room. A small wooden chair was located in

of each backdrop.

The

materials included a teddy bear

named "Teddy" and

a bowl, a pitcher and

teacup used during the warm-up phase. The four objects that were used for the object

substitution activity

were a yellow block (4 x 4

a white piece of paper (12 x 9

cm rectangle),

cm square),

a

flat

blue board

(15x6

and a red cylinder block (6.5 x 4 cm).

video camera was used to record the children's behaviors.
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cm),

A

C. Procedure

The experiment

consisted of four phases. Each child engaged
in a

an experimental

activity,

and a memory

activity,

trial.

warm-up

These procedures were followed

by a free play phase. In addition, the parent completed a survey
while the

engaged

a.

child

was

in the free play phase.

Warm-up phase
The warm-up phase included a

pitcher and a teacup, objects that were not used

ii

the later experimental phase to avoid modeling or interference for the child.
The child

was placed

in the

middle of the room.

He

or she

was

told that

we were

going to be

"pretending" and was asked to pour some "pretend" tea from the teapot into an empty
teacup.

The purpose of this warm-up phase was

to the child as well as to familiarize

b.

to introduce the concept

him or her with a play

of "pretend"

activity before testing began.

Experimental phase

Children were assigned randomly to one of two conditions

phase.

The order of presenting

was counterbalanced.
two

chairs.

the

two scenarios

In each condition the child

Each of the

chairs

was

the scenario being acted out and

(dinner or bedtime) in each condition

was

seated on the floor facing one of

located in front of one of the

signifying the dinner or bedtime scenario.

"Teddy" was seated

was moved

in the experimental

two backdrops

in the chair relevant to

to the second chair

when

the second

scenario began.

Before beginning the

first

four objects and told that there

of the two pretend scenarios, the

was only one of each,

19

child

was shown

all

to reduce the possibility that the

child might think different exemplars

scenarios. After

to the child

one

showing the

at

child

of the same objects were being used with the two

each object, they were placed out of view and
handed

a time during the experimental phase.

In the Between-Scenario condition, the task

was a modified version of one

employed by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993, experiments

3

and

4).

In their

work only

three objects were used for substitution in each of the pretend
scenarios. However, in
the present study four objects were used.

a

more systematic comparison of object

The number was

substitution in the

the Between-Scenario condition each of the four objects

each of the two scenarios presented to the

of the four objects each had two

child.

increased in order to provide

two

different conditions.

was given a

different identity in

For the Within- Scenario condition two

different identities within the first scenario

remaining two objects had two different

identities within the

summarizes the object substitutions used

in the

In

and the

second scenario. Table

1

Between-Scenario and Within-Scenario

conditions.

The

instructions and procedure for the Between-Scenario condition

were as

follows:

Dinner scenario: "OK.
and have

Now it's time for Teddy to

go

into the kitchen

his dinner."

Episode

1

:

child yellow block).

Episode
child blue

2:

"Teddy

is

having his dinner. This

Show me what Teddy does with
"Teddy

is

is

Teddy's sandwich (hand

his

having his ice cream. This

board with the bowl).

Show me what Teddy

20

sandwich."

is

Teddy's spoon (hand

does with

his

spoon."

Episode
piece of paper).

is

is

messy. This

Show me what Teddy

**Episode

Here

"Teddy

3:

"Teddy

4:

is

Teddy's napkin (hand child white

does with

his napkin."

likes sprinkles/chocolate syrup

with his

ice

cream.

a can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup (hand child red
cylinder block).

me what Teddy does
** Although

Show

with his sprinkles/chocolate syrup."
in piloting the

term "sprinkles" did not seem to create

confusion for the children, during the present study, some children
seemed

confused when asked to use the "sprinkles." Therefore, before the
experimental phase

likely to

identity

it

was necessary

to ask the parent

what

start

their child

of the

was more

comprehend, sprinkles or chocolate syrup. The "chocolate syrup"

was used interchangeably with the

"sprinkles" identity based

on

the

parent's judgment of their children's understanding of the terms.

After completion of the dinner activity

experimenter

moved

(if that scenario

was presented &st),

the child and

to the backdrop depicting the nighttime scene to engage in the

activity associated with that scenario.

Bedtime scenario: "OK.

Now it's time for Teddy to

go

into the

bathroom and

get ready for bed."

Episode

1

:

"Teddy

square yellow block).

Episode

2:

is

having a bath. This

is

Teddy's soap (hand child

Show me what Teddy does with his

"Teddy

(hand child blue board).

is

getting ready for bed. This

Show me what Teddy does
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soap."

is

Teddy's toothbrush

with his toothbrush."

Episode

"Teddy

3:

is

ready to go to bed now: "This

(hand child white piece of paper).

Episode

Teddy

4:

Show me what Teddy

likes a glass

is

Teddy's pillow

does with

of water before he goes to

his pillow."

sleep. This

is

Teddy's glass of water (hand child red cylinder block).
Show me what Teddy
does with

his water."

The

was

child

praised for his or her pretend activities.

For the Within-Scenario Condition, the presentation was altered

was necessary
object

to balance the objects

on two consecutive

trials.

and

slightly.

identities to avoid giving the child the

For example,

This

same

in

the Between-Scenario condition

=

red cylinder)

if the

"can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup"

(real object

"napkin" (white piece of paper)

the dinner scenario, in the Within-Scenario dinner

scenario the blue

"napkin").

The

flat

in

board would be presented on two

instructions and procedure

Dinner scenario: "OK.

Now

it's

was presented before

trials in

the

a row ("spoon" and

were as follows:

time for Teddy to go into the kitchen and have

his dinner."

Episode

I

:

"Teddy

child square yellow block).

Episode
child blue

2:

"Teddy

is

having his dinner. This

is

Show me what Teddy does
is

Teddy's sandwich (hand
with his sandwich."

having his ice cream. This

board with the bowl).

is

Teddy's spoon (hand

Show me what Teddy does
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with his spoon."

Episode

Here

is

"Teddy wants sprinkles/chocolate syrup with

3:

a can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup (hand child
yeUow square block).

Show me what Teddy does
Episode
board).

with the sprinkles/chocolate syrup.

"Teddy

4:

messy. This

is

Show me what Teddy does

After completion of the dinner activity

experimenter

his ice cream.

moved

to the

is

Teddy's napkin (hand child blue

with his napkin.

(if that

scenario

was presented

backdrop depicting the nighttime scene

to

first),

the child and

engage

in the

activity associated with that scenario.

Bedtime scenario: "OK.

Now it's time for Teddy to

go

into the

bathroom and

get ready for bed."

Episode
white paper).

1

:

"Teddy

is

having a bath. This

is

Show me what Teddy does with his

Episode

2:

"Teddy

is

3:

"Teddy

(hand child white paper).

Episode

4:

Teddy

is

soap."

getting ready for bed. This

(hand child red cylinder block).

Episode

Teddy's soap (hand child

Show me what Teddy

is

does with

ready to go to bed now. This

Show me what Teddy does
likes

Teddy's toothbrush

is

a glass of water before he goes to sleep. This

his water."

The

child

was

Teddy's pillow

with his pillow."

Teddy's glass of water (hand child red cylinder block). Show
does with

his toothbrush."

praised for his or her pretend activities.
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is

me what Teddy

c.

Memory phase
The memory phase began

after

each child had completed both scenarios

experimental phase. The child returned to the original
scenario and was

such a good job the &st time, but he
the experimental phase were placed

still

"You

did

needs your help." The four objects used during

on the

floor beside the child.

to select the object to be used to complete each episode in the

was

told:

in the

Since the child needed

memory

phase, the child

told the following:

Dinner Scenario
Episode

1

:

"OK.

wants a sandwich. Show
Episode

Now

it

is

time for Teddy to have dinner again.

me what Teddy

does with

think

Teddy

his sandwich."

2:

"Teddy

3:

"Now Teddy needs a napkin because he

is

I

having his ice cream now.

Show me what Teddy

does

with his spoon."

Episode

Teddy does with
Episode

is all

messy.

Show me what

his napkin"

"Remember Teddy

4:

Show me what Teddy

likes sprinkles/chocolate syrup

with his ice cream.

does with the can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup."

Bedtime Scenario
Episode
get clean.

1

:

"OK.

Now

it is

Show me what Teddy

Episode

2:

"Time

time for Teddy to get ready for bed.

does with

He wants

his soap."

for the toothbrush.

Show me what Teddy does

with his

Show me what Teddy does

with his

toothbrush."

Episode

3:

"Teddy wants

his pillow.
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to

pillow."

Episode

4:

"Teddy

is

thirsty again.

Show me what Teddy

does with

his

water."

The

d.

child

was

praised for each pretend activity,

Free-play phase

A free-play phase occurred after the memory trials had been completed.
portion of the study, the child was

in the

shown "Teddy" and

the four objects used previously

experiment and was encouraged to play with the materials

she chose.

The experimenter

left

the

room for the

who remained

instructed to respond in an appropriate

if the child

free play.

However, the parent was asked not

D. Scoring

in the

with the

child,

was

approached her or him during

in the free play activity, the parent

completed a survey consisting of questions concerning the

completed can be seen

whatever way he or

to initiate any play behavior with the child.

During the time the child was engaged

whether the child attended daycare or had

in

5 minute free-play phase, but the

video camera continued to record. The parent,

manner

In this

siblings, etc.

child's play activities at

The survey questions

home,

parents

Appendix.

& Analvses of Data

The videotapes depicting

the child's pretend activities were scored after

completion of the task. The camera was positioned

in the

child's level, to be able to record the play activity in front

the child's facial reactions.
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comer of the room,

at the

of both backdrops, as well as

During the experimental and memory phase of the experiment,
the participant

was

credited with a correct response, an incorrect response, or no
response, concerning

the use of the substitute object. During the experimental phase
a correct response

scored

it

when the

child successfiiUy acted

had been given. For example,

was

child

descriptive

summary of appropriate

if he

object can be found in Table 2.

when the

the object in accordance with the identity

for the statement,

spoon" the

correct

upon

was

"Show me what Teddy does with his

or she used the spoon to exhibit "feeding" teddy.

A

actions the child could initiate with each substitute

A correct response during the memory trials was scored

child successfully selected the appropriate substitute object based

on

its

assigned identity. The child was also scored in terms of using the substitute object

in the

appropriate manor, regardless of which item had been selected.

The

child could use four substitute objects in an appropriate

of the scenarios

in the

manor during each

experimental phase. There were also four opportunities to select

the appropriate object in the

memory phase of the experiment

scenarios and to perform with the substitute object in the

measure was obtained based on the number of times the

during each of the

memory phase.

In addition, a

child used the four substitute

objects correctly in both scenarios.

Reliability

was assessed by having a second person view

children's pretend activities.

The second observer viewed 60% of the experimental

sessions. Percentage agreement

between the main experimenter and the second observer

(calculated as agreements/agreements

phase,

94%

in the

the videotapes of the

+ disagreements) was 99%

memory phase where

for the experimental

the child selected the appropriate object and

26

96%

in the

that they

memory phase when the

child

performed an action with the substitute object

had selected.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
A.

Warm-up
Children had Uttle difficulty engaging

in the pretense activity during
the

warm-up

phase. All children seemed to accept shifting from reality
to pretense with ease, using
the pitcher to pour pretend "liquid" into a teacup.

B. Experimental Trials

Preliminary analyses were carried out to examine the effect of gender and
scenario order

on performance using an

therefore, the data

ANOVA.

were collapsed over these

There were no

factors.

significant effects;

The mean number of correct

responses for each age group for the dinner and bedtime scenario can be seen

Both age groups performed well

overall.

in

Table

3.

A "no" response, where the children did not

respond when asked to demonstrate an action with the object handed to them, occurred
in

only 9 out of 192 experimental

experimental

The

trials for

results

trials for

the 2.5-year-olds and 5 out of 192

the 3 -year-olds.

shown

in

Table 3 indicate that despite the relatively good

performance by both age groups, 3 -year-olds did better than
2 (condition)

2. 5 -year-olds.

A2

(age) x

ANOVA demonstrated a main effect for age (F (1, 44) = 4.09, p < 05).

Three-year-olds were able to use the objects appropriately significantly more frequently

than the 2.5-year-olds.

No

significant condition or

The mean frequency with which
objects correctly in both scenarios

is

the

shown

age x condition interaction was found.

two age groups used
in
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Table

4.

the four substitute

As can be seen

in this table, 3-

year-olds were better at using a single object to
represent two different identities during
the experiment than 2.5-year-olds.

A2

(age) x 2 (condition)

these data revealed a main effect only for age (F(l,
44)

no

significant interaction

was found between age and

=

ANOVA carried out on

4.03, p

condition.

=

.024).

Once again

However, although

3-

year-olds were able to use the substitute object both ways well
in either the Within- or

Between-Scenario condition, 2.5-year-olds had more
Scenario condition. In

two age groups

in the

fact,

a post-hoc

t-test

difficulty

performed on the

doing so

in the

Within-

results obtained

from the

Within-Scenario condition revealed that 3-year-olds performed

significantly better than the 2.5-year-olds

(t

=

-2.64, p

=

.015).

A closer examination of

the performance with the four objects revealed that in the Within-Scenario condition,

seven out of the twelve 2.5-year-olds were unsuccessfiil

demonstrate the "sprinkle/chocolate syrup" action and

in using the 'yellow block' to

five

out of twelve of the 2.5-year-

olds were unsuccessful in using the 'white paper' to demonstrate the "soap" action.

These unsuccessful

trials

by the

2. 5 -year-olds

contributed to the age difference between

the Between- and Within-Scenario conditions. Two-and-a-half-year-olds in the Within-

Scenario condition either perseverated with the object

yellow block they used

it

(ex. as a spoon), or they

sandwich)).

On the

condition were most

any other

as they had the blue board

(e.g.,

when

presented with the

on the immediately preceding

used the same yellow block as they had used

other hand, errors on the "soap"

trials in

it

trial

before (ex. as a

the Within-Scenario

commonly "no response" perhaps because

it

was not preceded by

activity in that scenario.

A major goal of the present
been given an

initial

study

identity for an object

was

to determine

would have
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whether children

difficulty in then using

who had
it

in

a

second way, particularly
scenario.

initial

To

if the

second identity had to be imposed within the
same

investigate this possibUity, the

means of the

children's performance

use of the object presented, was compared to their
performance on the second

presentation of that object in both conditions. However, as
can be seen Table

had

little

difficulty

engaging

in

seem

did not

to interfere with the second time they

Paired comparison t-tests for

effect in either the

C.

=

-1.14,

p>.

Memory
Once

5, children

a second activity using the same substitute object.
In

both the Between- and Within-Scenario conditions the

(^

on the

first

first

time the child used an object

were required

to use the

same

object.

versus second presentations revealed no significant

Between-Scenario

(/

=

-.9,

p >. 05) or the Within-Scenario condition

05).

Trials

again, in an

ANOVA,

no

significant effects for

gender or the order of

presentation of the scenarios were found and therefore the data were collapsed over
these conditions for fiirther analyses of performance on the

shows the mean number of times

memory trials
trials.

that

than on the experimental

when they were asked

trials

Table 6

when asked

on

that identity during the experimental

Although performance by the two age groups
trials

trials.

the child correctly selected the substitute object

had previously been assigned

lower on the memory

memory

in

both conditions was somewhat

to select the correct substitute object

to demonstrate

an appropriate

activity with

the substitute object, children, nevertheless, did quite well in selecting the correct objects
to use in each scenario. Performance for each age group and condition

chance

(2. 5 -year-olds in the

Between-Scenario condition

30

/

=

8.67, p

<

was above

.01, 2.5-year-olds

in the

Within-Scenario condition

condition

=

/

1 1

p <

.29,

However, the

.01).

.0

1

/

7.72, p

<

.01, 3-year-olds in the

Between- Scenario

3-year-olds in the Within-Scenario condition

,

shown

results

=

in

t

=

9.38, p

<

Table 6 also indicate that both 2.5- and 3-year-olds

are performing less well in the Within-Scenario condition
than in the Between-Scenario

condition during the

effect

of condition (F(l, 44) =

1

A 2 (age) x 2 (condition) ANOVA revealed a main

1.9,

p = .001) and no

significant effect for

age or

between age and condition

interaction

The
trials

memory trials.

overall

mean

for using an object in an appropriate

regardless of whether

experimental

trials,

was

it

was

7.25. This level of performance

exhibited during the experimental

can be seen

in

their choice

of action

Table

7.

the correct object based

trials.

The means

The 3-year-olds performed

after they

for

on

is

way
its

during the

assignment

memory

in

the

very similar to the level

each age group and condition

slightly better than 2.5-year-olds in

had selected an object to use.

A2

(age) x 2 (condition)

ANOVA revealed a main effect for age (F (1,44) = 4.3, p = .045) but no significant
effect for condition or significant interaction

group appeared to have
during the

memory

difficulty

between age and condition. Neither age

understanding what action they needed to accomplish

trial.

Table 8 shows the mean fi-equency for correctly choosing an object on the basis

of both

identities

given to

it

during the experimental phase. Children were more

choose the same substitute object both times
condition than

was

in the

if they

were

in the

if they

were

in the dinner

and once

Between-Scenario

Within-Scenario condition. In other words,

Between-Scenario condition, they were more

block once

in the

in the

likely to

if

a child

choose the yellow

bedtime scenario correctly, than
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likely to

if

the child

was

in the Within-Scenario condition

twice in the same scenario.
condition (F(l, 44)
interaction

=

A2

11.49,

where

(age) x 2 (condition)

p=

.001). Neither the

between age and condition was

results indicated that

chUdren

in the

selecting the correct object to use

greater difficulty

it

was necessary

it

when it was

choose the yeUow block

ANOVA revealed a main effect for

main

significant.

effect for

when

it

was

the

first

age nor the

Further investigation of the

Within-Scenario condition had

little

was found

in the

trials (t

=

difficulty

object assignment, but had

necessary to select the substitute object

had been used during the experimental

significant difference

to

2.57,

p <

.02).

in the

On the

Between-Scenario condition

(t

=

second way

other hand, no

-.9,

p >.05).

D. Free Play
Free play provided a window for the experimenter to observe
interpreted the events

of the experiment

after

identities persisted in their play behavior.

experiment into their

own play activities,

it

how the

had concluded and to see

if any

If children incorporated aspects

this

would serve

children

of the

of the

to indicate that they

only immersed in the act of pretense, but also were continuing to accept the

were not

identities

placed upon the substitute objects by the experimenter. Sixty-five percent of the children

engaged

in

a free play activity for 2 to 5 minutes after the experiment had ended.

these children

85%

included aspects of the experiment in their free play activity. This

activity included feeding

and putting the bear to bed, using the objects as the

given to them by the experimenter

the teddy bear

Of

on top of it

(e.g., the child

picked up the white paper and placed

as a pillow), etc.. Only one identity

chosen for each object during the

was predominantly

free play episode; children rarely switched
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identities

back and

forth in applying both identities that had
been given to a particular object during the

experiment while engaged

in free play.

Children were more likely to engage

in the free play activity if they

completed the Between-Scenario condition
(83%) compared
condition (48%) (F(l, 44)

=

6.61,

p=

This

.014).

may

had

just

to the Within-Scenario

help to account for the

observation that only one identity was associated with a
particular object during the free
play phase. Overall, children readUy engaged in the free play
activity and incorporated
aspects of the study into their play behavior.

E. Survev Responses

Correlational analyses were performed

obtained in the experimental and

on the survey responses and

memory phases of the

the findings

study. Table 9 reflects the

minimal amount of variation of parental responses on questions concerned with the

amount of play,

specifically pretend play

and television viewing. These responses did not

reveal significant correlations between the amount of time engaged in these kinds of

activities

and performance by the

children, except for parental interaction during pretense

and children's correct usage of the
(48)

=

.3 1,

p<

.05).

The higher

substitute object during the experimental phase (r

the rating a parent provided for the

amount of time they

spent pretending with their child at home, the better the child performed in the

experimental phase. Because children performed so successfully

phase, the importance of this relationship

that fifly-sk percent

is

unclear.

of the children involved

experimental

The survey responses

in the current

33

in the

also indicated

study attended day care at

least

two days a week.

Sixty-nine percent had older siblings
that Uved with

home.
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them

at

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

A. Object Substitution

in

Pretend Play

The present study was planned
as

young

their

to further demonstrate the capabilities

of children

as 2.5 years of age to engage in object substitution and
pretend play, and to test

memory

for the substitute objects and activities, under

that might permit evaluation

of four current perspectives on pretense.

During a pretense task involving object
years of age had

little

two presentation conditions

difficulty applying

asked to do so within the same or a

two

substitution, children

different identities to

different scenario.

of 2.5 and three

an object, whether

For instance, children were quite

capable of using the same piece of blue board as a spoon in the dinner scenario and then
as a toothbrush in the bedtime scenario, as occurred in the Between-Scenario condition.

Children were also able to use the piece of blue board as a napkin

even

after they previously

used

it

as a

spoon

in the

in the dinner scenario

same dinner scenario as occurred

in

the Within-Scenario condition.

Three-year-olds did perform significantly better on the experimental

2.5-year-olds. This

was expected,

more advanced than

considering the

demands of the

task.

trials

than

They may be

2.5-year-olds in understanding verbal instructions and actions, as

well as in maintaining attention to the task. Although the children

were capable of using

all

of the objects, the

3 -year-olds
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in the present

may have been

study

better equipped

to give

more than one

performed quite

each substitute object. Nevertheless,
2.5-year-olds

well.

Children had

either

identity to

little

two

difficulty applying

identities to the substitute objects in

of the scenarios during the experimental phase of the
experiment except

yellow block as a "can of sprinkles/chocolate syrup"

in the dinner scenario

paper as a bar of "soap" during the bedtime scenario. This

by 2.5-year-olds only, and
have the same

substitutes

is

and cannot have a highly

is

have been influenced by

(e.g.,

it

was not

at

younger ages, the

this factor.

it

of its own. By three years of age,

The younger

children in this experiment

may

The square yellow block may not have been as

cylindrical red block to a

also differed substantially

thick and

it

by perceptual or functional relations between

replaces.

form or function as the

The white paper

it

salient identity

less constrained

object substitutes and the one

syrup.

was demonstrated

using needs to be similar in form or function to that for which

however, the child

similar in

and the white

Within-Scenario condition only. Three-year-olds did not

Jackowitz and Watson (1980) found that

difficulty.

object the child

in the

difficulty

for the

was bigger than

can of sprinkles/chocolate

from the prototypical idea of soap

traditional soap). Overall, children

may have

acted more appropriately during the Between- Scenario condition because more

prototypical objects, were used. For example, the red cylinder

sprinkles/chocolate syrup" and the yellow block

was

first

case, the object

size

and shape to soap.

cylindrical

and

tall like

was used
a can;

was used

as the "can of

as the "bar of soap." In the

in the

second,

it

was

similar in

A future study is necessary to test whether the interference of

form or fimction played a

role in children's difficulty with these objects
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and

identities.

The

results

of the experimental phase do not support
the "flagging mechanism-

proposed by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993). According
flagged, e.g., "in this scenario this block
substitution, the

is

to their theory the scenario

a sandwich."

Had

this

cWldren would have experienced confusion when

is

occurred with the

it

was necessary

first

to

place an additional identity on the same object in
the Within-Scenario condition.

Performance would be expected to decrease
identity, since the substitute object

However,

scenario.

this

was not

in this condition

was already

linked to an

when

using the second

initial identity

within the

the finding.

Pemer's (1991) theory that during pretense, children separate pretend and
into

fiilly

two

different mental states or representations, although plausible, does not

reality

seem

to

explain the current findings of this study either. Differentiating pretend and real

identities

would enable the

children to apply multiple identities to an object, since they

would not be constrained by each

scenario as

is

the case according to Harris and

Kavanaugh's (1993) flagging mechanism. By separating the two representations, the
children could focus

on the pretend

identity, disregarding the real identity

Therefore, they would have the fi-eedom to use

activity (ex. use multiple identities with the

outcome

if children

same

the case

in the case

object.

as they desired during the pretense

object).

ignored the substituted object's true

representational abuse, for example, children

themselves

it

of the

may have

However, one

potential

identity, is the possibility

tried to "eat" the

of

block

of the "sandwich" or "wash" themselves with the piece of paper

of the "soap." Children

in the current

experiment seemed to have

little

keeping track of the true identity of the substitute object during the pretense
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in

difficulty

activity

when they were supposedly engaged

in

what Pemer (1991) considers the pretend

representation.

The

results

of the present study lend support to more

of Leslie's (1987) and

Lillard's (1993a). LesUe's

opportunity for the children to
to use

it

in

make

flexible theories like those

(1987) decoupler model provides an

a copy of the original object (the real identity) and

a different identity (the pretend identity) with no
interference from

identity. Children

a phone outside of the pretend context. Since the decoupler model

on

original

use this method in order to avoid representational abuse.
For example,

as mentioned earUer, children could use a banana as a phone
without thinking

scenario but

its

the object,

it

provides more

room

is

it

is

really

not focused on the

for the child to use multiple identities

for a substitute object both within and between the scenarios than does Harris and

Kavanaugh's (1993) flagging mechanism.

An issue

with Leslie's (1987) theory

is

whether

the pretend identity and the real identity of the object are linked together during

pretense.

It is

very possible that children could make multiple copies of the original

identity

of an object to be used during a pretend

indicate

how children would

of whether there
link

is

is

presented or

more complex

scenario, but Leslie (1987) does not

keep track of these multiple copies. There

is

also a question

a deletion of the link between one identity and an object

if the link

(e.g. "this

between the

block

is

real

and the pretend

when

identity simply

a

new

becomes

a "sandwich" or "soap""). In this case, children might

have a problem keeping track of the duplicate copies or the complex statement used
identify the linked set

of identities. The children

these difificuhies.
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in this

to

study did not demonstrate any of

The

results

of the experimental phase appear

to be readily explained by Lillard's

(1993a) theory on "cognitive backgrounding."
Past research has demonstrated that

any point during a pretend play episode chUdren
necessary

(e.g., children will

The chUdren

in this study

object they used

it

will rely

not attempt to eat a block

performed no

on a

when

realistic

appropriately most of the time, even

twice during the same pretend scenario. The

flexibility

premise when

pretending

differently. After being

if this

at

it

is

a cookie).

handed each substitute

required

them

of separating the

to use

it

real versus

pretend identities into different cognitive levels would allow the children
to freely use the
objects with several identities during the pretense activity without losing
sight of the
object's real identity.

Lillard's

(1993a) views on pretend play are not based on

propositions or distinct separations as are found in the other theories. Children are aware

of the necessary information
they are guided by

B.

Memory

related to the pretense activity (both real

this information, rather

than restricted by

and pretend), but

it.

for Object Subsitutions in Pretend Play

The memory phase

in this

Kavanaugh's (1993) proposal

experiment was included to

that a child

would have

substitute object's identity after a particular task

given; and to determine whether

memory

little

test Harris

difficulty

was complete

if the

for object substitutions

and

remembering the
proper cues were

would be

similar for

both the Within- and Between-Scenario conditions. Each age group performed

in the

Within- Scenario condition than

participants

still

showed

relatively

in the

less well

Between-Scenario condition, although

good memory
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for object substitution

even

in the

Within-Scenario condition.
identity

more often than

conditions

is

interesting

We

for the

found they chose the correct object
for the

second assigned

identity.

The

first

assigned

between the

difference

and provides limited support for Harris
and Kavanaugh's (1993)

position that flagging serves as a mechanism
facilitating object substitution. There
are
three reasons

One

why

this

possibility

may have

is

occurred.

that using

scenario places a larger cognitive

be able to store only the

one object as two

demand on

first identity

of the

earlier in that

when cued

same

in the

the children of both age groups.

substitute object, even

are quite capable of using the second identity

a consequence,

when

memory phase

scenario, children

may

different identities within the

though

same

They may

we know

they

instructed to by the experimenter.

As

to select the substitute object they used

simply fmd a suitable object for the ftmction

they need.

The second

possibility

is

that children preferred to assign a

object to the identity they were using.

memory

task,

When given more

was considered more

condition

prototypical

control over the episode in the

merely asked to choose an object themselves, they may have ignored the

previous identity the experimenter applied to

object

more

many

it

during the experimental

trials if another

prototypical. For example, during the Within-Scenario

children chose the white piece of paper

the dinner scenario rather than the blue board that

was

when asked

the item actually used during the

experimental phase as the "napkin." Perhaps children chose

closely resembled an actual napkin than a

flat,

this object

because

wooden, blue board. The

preference to select objects more highly similar
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for the "napkin" in

in

form or

it

more

children's

ftinction to the pretend

make

identity could

it

difficult

during the Within- Scenario condition
to select an object

multiple times. For example, the blue board

"spoon" but not as

similar to a "napkin"

may have been more

and the

children's

similar in

form

to a

performance may have

reflected this dilference.

An explanation

linked to Harris and Kavanaugh's
(1993) flagging

provides another possibUity for explaining these
substitution

is

Perhaps

results.

mechanism

memory

influenced by the context in which the substitution

is

for object

implemented, even

if

the children's abilities to use the substitute object during the original
play episodes are
not. Rovee-Collier (2000) trained infants with a mobile

when they

kicked.

or a blue drapery.

On the

side

of the

When presented

crib,

above

their cribs,

which moved

within the baby's view, she placed either a red

with the same mobile and the same color drapery,

after a delay, the infants kicked their feet. This footkick response demonstrated that

these infants retained the

was changed, a

memory of the

earlier training.

However,

contextual difference, the infants did not kick their

if the

feet.

context interrupted the retrieval of the relevant information necessary

properly to the stimulus of the mobile. Rovee-Collier, Schechter, Shyi

theorize that

memory

is

cues

at the level

in the

The change

in

order to respond

& Shields (1992)

ordered, with context as an important filtering mechanism for

the rest of the system; "Thus, attention to potential retrieval cues

screened

in

drapery color

of the context, and perceptual

identification

is first filtered

of appropriate

context permits attention to flow to the next level (the focal cue)."

perspective, the contextual cues serve in

much

the

or

retrieval

From

this

same way as Harris and Kavanaugh's

views concerning a flagging mechanism's beneficial

(1993) flagging mechanism and

their

role during pretense. If children

were flagging the pretend
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scenario, the scenario itself

would serve

two

as the context

children base their

memory

identities are assigned to a given substitute
object during the

scenario) the children

may have
first

upon which

difficulties

may form a memory

representation of the

representation.

same context

first

(or

relationship, but

with the second one because the context has been
assigned to the

association.

Many studies of state-dependent
effects in

memory, demonstrated

learning also relate to the analyzing of context

in object substitution during play.

the contexts in which pretense occurs

is

abilities

of individuals to

given the

initial

retain information in the

performed a study where participants learned a

land) in

same contexts

information (Eich 2000). For example,

land. If these participants

were tested

In

many

further illustrated by the findings

importance of state-dependent learning. State-dependent learning

after

list

of words

refers to the increased

in

which they were

either

under water or on

significantly better.

These words were presented
for each

of the two

places) for each

lists

sessions, or

between two

of the two sessions and

neutral setting.

They found

memorized the

lists in

of words, during two

that recall

all

was

at different

( 1

989) asked the

different study sessions.

(physically the

different contexts (physically

same place)

two

different

the participants were eventually tested in a

significantly better

different contexts than

same context, even

same context

either within the

A study

especially relevant to our

study. During their experimental phase, Bjork and Richardson-Klavehn

memorize two separate

showing the

a delay within the same context (water or

which they had learned the words, they performed

participants to

respects,

Godden and Baddeley (1975)

completed by Bjork and Richardson-Klavehn (1989) proves

the

When

when

study sessions.
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when the

participants

they memorized the same

lists

within

Bjork and Richardson-Klavehn's
(1989) findings provide support for the

importance of distinctive contexts for memory.

of learning multiple items (or

identities in

It

appears that the most optimal method

our case) would be to do so using multiple

contexts, as the children demonstrated in the
Between-Scenario condition. Rovee-Collier

(2000) demonstrated

infants'

use of context

memory, Bjork and Richardson-KIavehn

in

(1989) did so with younger adults and Schramke and Bauer (1997) tested 60
olds and also found that context

is

strongly associated with recall

-

80-year-

suggest

abilities, to

that adults "are automatically storing and retrieving contextual
information... (p 260)."

Context remains an important aid

seems quite plausible

in

that children

our memory processes throughout our

would

find

it

more

difficult to learn

information about two identities being applied to one substitute object

and

lives

it

and store

when

different

contexts (scenarios) are not available to provide them retrieval cues. Harris and

Kavanaugh's (1993) flagging mechanism seems to offer an explanation
viewpoint emphasizing the importance of state-dependent

phase of the current study; Thus,
children's behavior

this

effects, as

similar to this

seen

in

the

mechanism may provide an explanation

when remembering

multiple identities within the

same

memory

for the

scenario.

In conclusion, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) seemed to have overestimated the

importance of a flagging mechanism for object substitution during pretense. However,

the

mechanism may provide some explanation

memories

for the identities

Both 2.5 and

3 -year-olds

different identities, both

of the objects

were able

for

how

these children retrieve the

after they take part in the pretend scenarios.

to use substitute objects appropriately in

between and within a given scenario. Even though

performance on the memory

trials

two

their

did decline, children were able to choose the
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appropriate objects to use during a scenario
the majority of the time

and had

little

difficulty using these substitute
objects after they

in

both scenarios,

had chosen them.

Children of this age seem quite willing and
capable of applying several identities to a
substitute object during a pretend activity,

memory

though they may have some diminished

for or capacity to choose the appropriate
substitute object in

way. Future research goals include explaining the thinking

more than one

that underlies the behavior

these children, not only in experimental settings, but also
during pretense activities in
general.
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of

Table

1:

Object Substitutions

in the

Between- and Within-Scenario Conditions
Dinner Scenario

Bedtime Scenario

Yellow Block

Sandwich

Soap

Blue Board
White Paper

Spoon

Toothbrush

Between-Scenario
Flat

Red Cylinder

Napkin

Pillow

Can of Sprinkles/

Glass of Water

Chocolate Syrup
Within-Scenario

Yellow Block

Sandwich

Can of Sprinkles/
Chocolate Syrup
Flat

Blue Board

Spoon
Napkin

White Paper

Red

Soap
PiUow

Cylinder

Toothbrush
Glass of Water
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Table

2:

Appropriate Actions for Substituted Objects

in the

Experimental and

Memory

Trials

Dinner

Sandwich

Appropriate Actions

Act as

"feeding" the bear, place the object

if

near his mouth,

Spoon

Same

make

eating noises

as above, but also incorporate

"scooping" motion with "spoon"

Napkin

Act as

if

"cleaning" the bear, bring the object

to the face and rub back and forth

Can of Sprinkles/Chocolate
Syrup

Bedtime Identity

Soap

Act as

if "pouring" sprinkles into

object above

bowl, raising

bowl and shaking

Appropriate Actions

Act as

if "washing"

the bear, place object

on and rub

back and forth

Toothbrush

Act as

if "brushing"

the bear's teeth, bring object to

mouth and move back and

PiUow

forth

Placing the bear's head on top of the pillow as

if

going

to "sleep"

Glass of Water

Bring the object to the bear's mouth, make drinking no

Noise
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Table

3:

Mean Numbers

(and Standard Deviations) of Appropriate Actions
on the
Experimental Trials by Age and Condition

Dinner

Bedtime

Total Correct

Responses
2.5-year-olds

Between-Scenario

3.6 (.79)

3.6 (.67)

7.2

Within-Scenario

3.3 (.75)

3.6 (.52)

6.9

Between-Scenario

3.6 (.51)

3.9 (.30)

7.5

Within-Scenario

3.8 (.60)

3.9 (.38)

7.7

3-year-olds
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Table

4:

Mean Numbers
Identities

.

(and Standard Deviations) of Correct Actions
for Both Object
During Experimental Trials by Age and Condition

Between-Scenario

2.5-year-olds

3.25 (1.10)

3-year-olds

3.6

Within-Scenario

2.75 (.87)

(.69)

3.6 (.77)
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Table

5:

Mean Actions (and Standard Deviations) on the First vs. Second
Presentations of the Substitute Objects During Experimental
Trials by Age and

Successful

Condition

First Presentation

Second Presentation

2.5-year-olds

Between-Scenario

3.4 (.79)

3.8 (.62)

Within-Scenario

3.6 (.52)

3.3 (.75)

Between-Scenario

3.8 (.41)

3.7 (.47)

Within-Scenario

3.9 (.38)

3.8 (.60)

14.7

14.6

3 -year-olds

Totals:
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Table

6:

Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Correct
Memory Trials by Age and Condition
Dinner

Bedtime

Object Choices on

Total Correct Responses

2. 5 -year-olds

Between-Scenario

3.3 (.65)

Within-Scenario

2.2 (.72)

2.9 (.99)

5.1

Between-Scenario

3.5 (.82)

3.2 (.98)

6.7

Within-Scenario

2.4 (.77)

2.7 (.77)

5.1

2.8(1.42)

6.1

3 -year-olds
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Table

7:

Mean Numbers (and Standard Deviations) of Appropriate
During the Memory Trials by Age and Condition

-

Between-Scenario

2.5-year-olds

7.3 (.87)

6.8 (.94)

3-year-olds

7.4 (.92)

7.7 (.48)

Within-Scenario
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Object Actions

Table

8:

Mean Numbers
Identities

(and Standard Deviations) of Correct Choices

During the

Memory

Trials

—

Between-Scenario

2.5-year-olds

2.33 (1.44)

3-year-olds

2.73

(

by Age and Condition
Within-Scenario

1.50(1.0)

1.1)

1.23 (1.17)
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Table

9:

Parental Ratings (and Standard Deviations)
of Children's

Behaviors

2.5-vear-olds

3-vear-olds

A. Play participation

4.6 (.58)

4.8 (.44)

B. Television viewing

3.0 (.81)

3.2 (.42)

C. Pretend activities

3.9 (.88)

4.5 (.72)

D. Object substitution

3.8 (.96)

3.9 (.72)

3.7(1.1)

3.4(1.3)

in pretense

E. Sibling interaction
in pretense

F.

Parental interaction

3.6 (.72)

in pretense

*

The

scale ranged from

1

(never) to 5 (very often)
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3.7 (.82)

Home

APPENDIX

SURVEY QUESTIONS DISTRIBUTED TO PARENTS
1)

Does your chUd have any

Does your

how many days/hrs.

a

3) Please rate the following questions

=

A.

B.

2 =

never

1

2

Does your

child

between

almost never

3

and 5 according to the scale below.

1

= sometimes

watch

4 = often

5

= very

often

4

3

child

engage

in

at

4

5

3

E. If siblings,

1

2

how often do
2

5

pretend activities

How often do they use object
1

5

television?

2

1

4

3

2

Does your

C.

F.

week?

How often is your child engaged in play activities?

1

D.

Y/N

Y/N

child attend daycare?

If so for

1

same household as him or her?

what gender and how old?

If so,

2)

siblings that live in the

substitution at

4

3

home?

home

during pretend activities?

5

they interact with them in a pretend setting?

4

3

5

N/A

How often do you engage in pretend play with your child?
1

2

4

3
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